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SENSITIVE

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700822



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 22 August 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only



SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

APRIL - AUGUST 1970 1968-1970 Weekly data as reported Weekly average for each month continued to decline **US BATTLE DEATHS** as only 55 were reported 600 July June versus last week's 69. 1968 500 500 400 400 300 200 200 100 20 J FMAMJ JASOND dropped sharply to 150 from SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS last week's 257. This week's 600 600 August July reported total is the lowest since July 1969. The official 500 total will change as late reports 400 400 are received and will be lower than the figures released to the 300 300 press by the GVN. 200 200 100 J FMAM J J A SOND INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE stand at zero for the week. The total number of infil-7000 7000 August trators since 23 October 1969 6000 6000 remains at 64,000 - 65,500. 5000 5000 4000 4000 3000 3000 2000 2000 1000 1000 27 18 25 16 23 30 decreased to 567 after last **ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS** week's rise to 671. 1200 1200 June July 1000 1000 800 800 600 600 400 400 200 200 1 FM AM J J A S O N D dropped to 1,055, the lowest **ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION** total since the week of 6000 July 6000 13 July 1968. Last week's May total was 1,924 vice the 3,186 5000 from preliminary field 4000 4000 reporting. 3000 3000 2000 2000 1000 1000 18 25 20 27 J FMAMJ J A SON D as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS July 100 % declined to 63% from last 100% week's adjusted figure of 73%. 60 60 40 40 20 20

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11 18 25

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

13 20 27

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Enemy Activity

Following last week's action in Quang Tri Province, combat activity in South Vietnam fell to its lowest level in several months, resulting in very light casualties on both sides. Major enemy units continue to threaten U.S. and ARVN positions in Quang Tri, however, and renewed fighting there could occur at any time. There are also indications that the Communists are preparing to launch their monthly "highpoint" in Military Region (MR) 4 sometime before the end of August. Any such "highpoint" will probably consist of an increased number of indirect fire attacks together with isolated ground attacks against pacification targets.

In Laos, as of 24 August heavy rain was hampering Royal Lao Government (RLG) offensive activity on all fronts. In MR II, RLG guerrillas helilifted into enemy territory on 18 August were battling to recover a position lost on 21 August when North Vietnamese Army troops launched a vigorous counterattack. In the south, friendly forces continued to hold their ground on the Bolovens Plateau (MR IV) against sharp enemy attacks. MR III was quiet while a four-battalion sweep operation in MR I found and destroyed a small enemy ammunition cache and a ricedenial operation in MR V was successfully concluded.

In Cambodia this week, the Communists exerted their heaviest pressure to date on Phnom Penh as government positions near Prek Tameak, only 15 kilometers northeast of the capital, were unsuccessfully assaulted and another site, three kilometers to the east, was lightly mortared. Fresh government troops have now cleared the area and while the attacking enemy forces have been dispersed, there is continuing concern that the Communists intend further offensive action around the city. Elsewhere, no major enemy activity occurred, but the Communists continue to harass by fire the towns of Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, Kampot, and Prey Veng. Recent evidence, moreover, indicates that Kralanh (near Siem Reap) and the town of Pursat are slated to be attacked.

Enemy Infiltration

The low level of personnel infiltration continues as no new south-bound groups were detected during the week. The infiltration total since 23 October 1969 remains at an estimated 64,000 - 65,500.

According to recently intercepted enemy communications, the senior North Vietnamese logistics authority in Laos will expand its operations into Cambodia during the coming dry season with a long range mission of aiding a successful offensive in "the strategic corridor and the liberated areas of central, southern, and northeastern Cambodia." With the loss to the Communists of the Sihanoukville supply route, this transportation mechanism will have to assume greater strategic importance to the enemy than ever before.

South Vietnam Developments

President Thieu has asked the chairman of the Senate to convene a special session of the Upper House immediately after the 30 August elections to consider his request for special powers in the economic field. On the sensitive exchange rate issue, Thieu is asking only for Senate endorsement of his authority to adjust the rate — if this is not forthcoming he says he plans to take necessary action under executive authority. Although the official rate of 118-1 would remain unchanged, a 275-1 rate would be applied to personal purchases of piasters by foreign nationals, to exports, and to some imports. Legal experts disagree over what remaining portions of the economic reform program could constitutionally be instituted by decree, although tax changes are generally regarded as a legislative prerogative. There is strong opposition in the Senate to granting Thieu the necessary emergency powers, and prompt action seems unlikely. A resort to executive decree, particularly if expected price rises should occur, would result in an adverse public reaction, subject the president to charges of dictatorship, further damage executive-legislative relations, and provide opposition groups with a new, politically explosive issue.

The latest reshuffling of regional (formerly corps) commanders should result in improved military leadership. General Lu Lan, long regarded as corrupt and incompetent, has finally been removed as commander of MR 2, and will be replaced by General Dzu, the present commander of MR 4. Dzu, who also has a good combat record, was

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reportedly chosen because of the effective pacification program he implemented in the Mekong Delta, and his talents in this could be used to advantage in MR 2 where pacification progress has been recently challenged by the Communists in several key provinces. Dzu will be replaced by the widely respected General Truong, commander of the ARVN 1st Division. Both Dzu and Truong are natives of their newly assigned areas. Another promising young officer, General Phu, will take over the 1st Division, which plays a key role in the defense of the two provinces just south of the DMZ.

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